|
United States Navy History, focusing on the Atlantic, 8th, 2nd and 4th Fleets Part 3 of 4 (1990 to 2011) |
|
A Sailors tale of his Tour of duty in the U.S. Navy (August 1977 to February 1983) Operation Evening Light and Eagle Claw - 24 April 1980
Book - ISBN NO. 978-1-4276-0454-5 EBook - ISBN NO. 978-1-329-15473-5
Operations Evening Light and Eagle Claw (24 April 1980) Iran and Air Arm History (1941 to 1980)
Book ISBN NO. xxxxxxxxxxxxx EBook ISBN NO. 978-1-329-19945-3
|
|
United States Navy History, focusing on the Atlantic, 8th, 2nd and 4th Fleets Part 1 of 4 (1778 to 1918) Part 2 of 4 (1919 to 1989) Part 3 of 4 (1990 to 2011) Part 4 of 4 (2nd, Fleet Forces Command & 4th Fleet (8th decommissioned)
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm
“Operation Desert Shield was President George Bush's massive military build-up in the Middle East in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Under the command of former USLANTCOM ground operations adviser for Operation Urgent Fury, Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, forces from all unified commands, including USLANTCOM, were sent to Southwest Asia to support the operation and subsequently support Operation Desert Storm. The nature of USLANTCOM's mission meant that its contribution to the war was aircraft carrier group support and a surface logistics bridge that stretched to the Arabian Peninsula” (Ref. 313B15aa).
A Final Hurrah
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/battleships/newjersey/nj-1984beirut.jpg
First Iraq War
“The invasion of neighboring Kuwait by Iraqi dictator Sadam Hussein in February 1991 postponed the fate of USS Missouri (BB-63) and USS Wisconsin (BB-64). The big guns of the two battleships hammered at land targets in Kuwait in support of the Allied ground offensive. Iraq agreed to a cease fire agreement on Feb. 28, 1991. The 600-ship Navy was never realized and, instead, defense budgets continued to shrink. For this and other like reasons, USS Iowa (BB-61) and USS New Jersey (BB-62) were decommissioned for a final time by early 1991” (Ref. 313B6).
“Fresh off victories in Panama in 1989-1990 and the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991, the US military began highlighting lessons learned from those campaigns and analyzing emerging threats in the new, post-cold war world. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, among others, knew the key to meeting challenges of the future was refining how US Services work together in joint operations. He felt that a single, US-based unified command should be responsible for training forces from all services for joint operations. This unified command would supply ready joint forces to other unified commanders-in-chief anywhere in the world.
After the Haitian military deposed democratically-elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1991, the US had imposed economic sanctions against the small nation. Resulting economic hardships and political oppression led many Haitians to flee to nearby US shores in makeshift boats. USLANTCOM played a major role in the episode, setting up and maintaining a temporary migrant camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for thousands of Haitian refugees, called Operation GTMO, pronounced "gitmo," short for Guantanamo” (Ref. 313B15aa).
USS Missouri (BB-63) decommissioned
“The cost of operating these ships, the labor-intensive manning, and the more modern, more powerful cruisers and destroyers of today's Navy led to their final decommissioning as well. The last battleship on active duty was USS Missouri (BB-63) decommissioned Mar. 31, 1992. In the 21st century, there are no battleships in the United States Navy.
Complete list of all the battleships
For a complete list of all the battleships that served with the Navy, see the "List of Battleships." This list gives the ships' names, their dates of commissioning(s) and decommissioning(s), and the eventual fate each one met. There are also links from the ships' name to an up-to-date, illustrated history of each ship” (Ref. 313B6).
U.S. Atlantic Fleet became the naval component commander for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command “On 1 June 1992, the Commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet became the naval component commander for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, assuming responsibility for all U.S. Navy operational and training matters under USSTRATCOM” (Ref. 313B1 & 313B2).
The Atlantic Fleet joins NATO forces in supporting the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic
“While providing combat ready forces to theater commanders in the world's hotspots is a primary responsibility, the Atlantic Fleet also joins NATO forces in supporting the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, a permanent squadron of destroyers and frigates representing NATO forces in the Atlantic Region. Additionally, Atlantic Fleet units participate annually in UNITAS, a deployment to South America. This yearly deployment creates unique training opportunities with South American Navies and spreads goodwill to our South American allies” (Ref. 313B1).
Atlantic Fleet regionalized its shore infrastructure management through three Regional Commanders (New London, Norfolk and Jacksonville
“The Atlantic Fleet is also working to further regionalize its shore infrastructure management through three Regional Commanders (New London, Norfolk and Jacksonville). Additionally, a comprehensive review of afloat forces' workload and training has been chartered by CNO to reduce the demands placed upon Navy people during their Interdeployment Training Cycle (IDTC). On a daily basis, a significant portion of the Atlantic Fleet is either deployed overseas, conducting underway exercises in preparation for deployment or is involved in another phase of the IDTC. Recent joint initiatives between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets have led to a major change in the way business is conducted for surface ships and aircraft squadrons in the IDTC. Many inspections and administrative requirements have been eliminated or reduced in order to provide flexibility to unit commanders.
"Smart Ship", "Smart Work" and "Smart Tool"
Adding to the new direction the Atlantic Fleet has been heading is a focus on new concepts like "Smart Ship", "Smart Work" and "Smart Tool". Each are unique management approaches and applications of technology encouraging leadership to maximize the professionalism of their team while enhancing the professional experience of Atlantic Fleet Sailors” (Ref. 313B1).
USACOM
“In 1993, US Atlantic Command fulfilled General Powell's vision and became the first unified command to serve as US-based force trainer, integrator and provider. Under the new Unified Command Plan, signed by President Bill Clinton on 24 September 1993, US Atlantic Command (with a new acronym, USACOM) assumed combatant command of the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM); the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC); the Marine Corps Forces Command, Atlantic (MARFORLANT); and the Navy's Commader in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). Integration of the service component commands marked the first time that USACOM had permanent, peacetime control of major elements from all 4 services. The changes dramatically transformed the command's traditional Navy/Marine Corps composition. A new mission, to ensure all forces going into combat, anywhere in the world, would fight as integrated joint teams, was added to the command's existing Atlantic Ocean geographic mission. USACOM did continue conducting operations in its area of geographic responsibility. After convincing the Haitian regime to step down peacefully in 1994, the US ordered the Command to deploy a task force, along with troops from the international community, to the island nation to restore order and ensure a democratic government. As the situation stabilized, US forces slowly withdrew troops and control of the peacekeeping operation” (Ref. 313B15aa).
“As part of a reorganization announced in July 1995 of the Atlantic Fleet's surface combatant ships into six core battle groups, nine destroyer squadrons, and a new Western Hemisphere Group, USS John Hancock was reassigned to Destroyer Squadron 24. The re-organization was to be phased in over the summer and take effect 31 August 1995” (Ref. 313B; 313B1 & 313B8).
“In September 1995 the following ship assignments were intended to apply at the end of the transitional period” (Ref. 313B14):
· Western Hemisphere Group (to be homeported at Naval Station Pascagoula and Naval Station Mayport): USS Ticonderoga (CG-47), USS Yorktown (CG-48), USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51) (to move to Pascagoula in FY 98), USS Robert G. Bradley (FFG-49), Conolly, Scott, DDG-993, Moosebrugger, Dewert, McInerney, Boone, Doyle, Aubrey Fitch and Stark. · Cruiser-Destroyer Group 2/Washington Battle Group: CGN-37, CG-60 · Carrier Group 2/Stennis Joint Task Group: USS San Jacinto, USS Monterey · Carrier Group 6/Kennedy/America Joint Task Group: USS Vicksburg, USS Hue City, and USS Thomas S. Gates until Gates was transferred to the Western Hemisphere Group · Cruiser-Destroyer Group 8/Eisenhower Joint Task Group: USS Anzio (CG-68), USS Cape St. George (CG-71) Cruiser-Destroyer Group 12/Enterprise Joint Task Group: USS Philippine Sea (CG-58), USS Gettysburg (CG-64)
USACOM
“The United Nations assumed responsibility for Haitian operations in early 1995, although the US still provided assets. Later in 1995, the Haitian people elected a new president. During the operation, USACOM once again opened a migrant camp for Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay during Operation Sea Signal. After government leadership was restored, most migrants were returned to Haiti. Only about 10,000 were allowed to stay in the United States.at Guantanamo Bay” (Ref. 313B15aa).
“In 1997, USACOM's stewardship of the Caribbean was transferred to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The Command did continue to had a geographic responsibility, exercising control over annual Deep Freeze explorations, which had begun in 1956, where scientists and supporting military personnel deployed to Antarctica to conduct experiments. As the unified command headquarters responsible for the region, USACOM had directed Deep Freeze operations, which included moving personnel and supplies to the region during its summer months, December to February.
In October 1999, US Atlantic Command became United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to emphasize the command's role leading transformation of US military forces. Still one of 5 geographic combatant unified commands, USJFCOM formally took on a more functional role with the new name. It became the only unified command with both a geographic area and functional responsibilities” (Ref. 313B15aa).
DEFINING U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND.S ROLE IN THE POWER PROJECTION STRATEGY - 1999 - Ref. 313J
JOINT EXPERIMENTATION: A SYSTEMS APPROACH by MAJ Kenneth T. Royar, USA, 56 pages – Ref. 313L
“The Secretary of Defense charged the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) on 1 October 1998 to conduct Joint Experimentation (JE) in support of the Defense of Department (DoD) Joint Vision 2010 concept. Since a common definition of joint experimentation did not exist, the mandate not only required USACOM to conduct joint experimentation, but also to define exactly what it is. In response, USACOM, now United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) established the J9 Directorate under its command to accomplish this task. It was given the objective of the JE program to provide recommendations to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on how to improve the doctrine, organizational structures, training, material, leadership and personnel programs to provide the future joint force the capabilities of full spectrum dominance. The question this monograph addresses is how should the military go about joint experimentation - specifically should the joint experimentation program be based on systems theory.
The monograph initially examines what led to the requirement for the JE program, a description of the JE program as outlined in Joint Forces Command's JE Campaign Plan 2000 and a review of previous assessments of the JE program. After defining systems theory and addressing its benefits and criticisms, the monograph analyzes the use of systems theory in the joint experimentation process against three criteria. First, would the application of systems theory help achieve the stated objections of the JE program? Second, does systems theory reflect how the military intends to conduct warfighting?
Finally, would the use of systems theory at the joint level provide any benefits not provided by other means? The monograph concludes that systems theory should be the basis for joint experimentation. While some elements of systems theory exist within the experimentation program outlined in Campaign Plan 2000, there are several elements of systems theory not present. Finally, the monograph recommends several actions the Secretary of Defense should take in conjunction with the adoption of systems theory” (Ref. 313L).
U.S. Atlantic Fleet in the 21st Century
“As of 2000, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet provided fully trained, combat ready forces to support United States and NATO commanders in regions of conflict throughout the world. From the Adriatic Sea to the Arabian Gulf, Atlantic Fleet units respond to National Command Authority tasking. Recent conflicts involving Atlantic Fleet units include Operation Allied Force in the Adriatic Sea and Operation Desert Fox in the Arabian Gulf” (Ref. 313B1 & 313B).
“From 1 February 1991 to 17 February 2000, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet was the naval component commander for the unified Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, assuming responsibility for all U.S. Navy operational and training matters in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. On 17 February 2000, these responsibilities were reassigned to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (formerly Commander, South Atlantic Force), assuming naval component commander duties for the unified USSOUTHCOM. However, COMUSNAVSO does not have any permanently assigned afloat forces. CINCLANTFLT, at the direction of USJFCOM (formerly USCINCLANT), remains the major force provider for USNAVSO for forces attached in support of USSOUTHCOM operations and exercises” (Ref. 313B1 & 313B2).
“The Atlantic Fleet before it’s decommission and redesignation, consisted of over 118,000 Sailors and Marines, 186 ships and in 1,300 aircraft, with an area of responsibility ranging over most of its operational force (i.e., the formation of fighting ships) is Task Force 20 (TF 20). USFLTFORCOM is based at Naval Station Norfolk in Norfolk, Virginia. Additionally, there are 18 major shore stations providing training, maintenance and logistics support, as well as support to Navy and Marine Corps families. The Atlantic Fleet area of responsibility encompasses a massive geographic area including the area of the Atlantic Ocean from the North Pole to the South Pole, the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the waters of the Pacific Ocean along the coasts of Central and South America (as far west as the Galapagos Islands). Additionally, the area includes the Norwegian, Greenland and Barents Seas, and the waters around Africa extending to the Cape of Good Hope” (Ref. 313B1 & 313B).
“The operational fleet in the Atlantic Fleet before it’s decommission and redesignation to Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM), consisted of the 2nd Fleet, itself decommissioned July 1, 2011, when the Navy's Fleet Forces Command took over Second Fleet duties. The 2nd Fleet provided operational tasking as well as training carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups for forward deployments overseas. Atlantic Fleet forces are supported by type commanders responsible for readiness support, logistics support and administrative management from it’s commission. The type commanders include air, surface, submarine and Marine forces for the Atlantic Fleet, each headquartered in Norfolk. Va.” (Ref. 313B1).
Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC)
“On 1 October 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Vern Clark announced that the Navy took the next step in aligning the fleet to more effectively achieve its primary mission: to carry American sovereignty to the four corners of the world, to defend America's interests and to fight and win, should deterrence fail, designating Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) as concurrent Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM); becoming the Naval component commander for the newly-formed U.S. Northern Command, assuming responsibility for all U.S. Navy operational and training matters under Commander, U.S. Northern Command, a new command responsible for overall coordination, establishment, and implementation of integrated requirements and policies for manning, equipping, and training Atlantic and Pacific Fleet units during the inter-deployment training cycle” (Ref. 313B & 313B2).
“The United States Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) is a service component command of the United States Navy that provides naval resources that are under the administrative control of the Secretary of the Navy. The naval resources may be allocated to Combatant Commanders such as United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) under the authority of the Secretary of Defense” (Ref. 313B).
“The most significant element of this initiative was to establish Commander, U.S. Fleet Command (CFFC) as a concurrent responsibility of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). CFFC is responsible for overall coordination, establishment and implementation of integrated requirements and policies for manning, equipping and training Atlantic and Pacific fleet units during the inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC). The policies and requirements will achieve standard fleet-wide practices on both coasts. The objective is that there's not one ounce of difference in the way these units work. The standards that were used to create a trained and ready product were the same “regardless of where that training was conducted” (Ref. 313B1).
To support CFFC in this task, type commanders (TYCOM) within each warfare community became the commanders of Naval Surface Force Pacific, Naval Air Force Pacific and Submarine Force Atlantic. They assumed concurrent duties as fleet TYCOMS, known as Commander, Naval Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR); Commander, Naval Air Forces (COMNAVAIRFOR); and Commander, Naval Submarine Forces (COMNAVSUBFOR). These fleet TYCOMs lead their communities and advise CFFC of vital issues such as modernization needs, training initiatives, and operational concept development. They provide guidance to their respective forces via the existing lead-follow TYCOM arrangement. CFFC is also supported by Commander, 3rd Fleet, who reports on issues pertaining to the development and implementation of IDTC requirements and policies for West Coast naval units.
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) in Newport, RI, reports to CFFC as its immediate superior, for purposes of warfare innovation, concept development, fleet and joint experimentation, and the synchronization and dissemination of doctrine. NWDC will continue to report to the Naval War College in the process of concept development and to the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and programs on issues pertaining to Navy transformation, and the development of warfare requirements and programs. This strengthened fleet and CNO-directed relationship will allow NWDC to expand its leading role in Navy experimentation and transformation.
Commander, Fleet Forces Command is taking the lead in organizing the Navy's Homeland security effort” (Ref. 313B1).
U. S. Fleet Forces Command – Ref. 313B2
“U.S. Fleet Forces Command, USFLTFORCOM, headquartered in Norfolk, Va., is the U.S. Navy component of U.S. Joint Forces Command. The command's mission is to organize, man, train, and equip Naval Forces for assignment to Unified Command Combatant commanders; to deter, detect, and defend against homeland maritime threats; and to articulate Fleet warfighting and readiness requirements to the Chief of Naval Operations.
USFLTFORCOM provides fully trained, combat ready forces to support United States and NATO commanders in regions of conflict throughout the world. From the Adriatic Sea to the Arabian Gulf, USFLTFORCOM units are called upon to support U.S. theater commanders and joint task force commanders for unified operations around the world.
The command’s vision is an effectively prepared total Navy force ready to win in combat. Authoritatively defined and consistently accepted Fleet readiness and warfighting capabilities. Transformational change achieved through CONOPs and doctrine development. Navy forces and operational planning for combatant commanders are agile, powerful, and persistent. Recent joint initiatives between USFLTFORCOM and Pacific Fleets have led to a major change in the way surface ships and aircraft squadrons are managed during the interdeployment training cycle. Many inspections and administrative requirements have been streamlined or eliminated in order to provide increased flexibility and efficiency to unit commanders” (Ref. 313B3).
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that the title of "Commander in Chief" be reserved solely for the President of the United States
“On 24 October 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that the title of "Commander in Chief" be reserved solely for the President of the United States. In a message to Naval Commanders in Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a change of title to that of "Commander." This change affected the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and U.S. Naval Forces Europe” (Ref. 313B2). “The title of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet was discontinued and the title of Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMLANTFLT) was established” (Ref. 313B; 313B1 & 313B8).
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMLANTFLT)
On 1 February 1941, the United States Fleet was reorganized to form the U.S. Atlantic, U.S. Pacific and U.S. Asiatic Fleets, each with a four-star commander in chief. The title of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet was in continuous use from February 1941 through 24 October 2002. In October 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that the title of "Commander in Chief" be reserved solely for the President of the United States. In a message to Naval Commanders in Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a change of title to that of "Commander." Accordingly, on 24 October 2002 the title of Commander in Chief was discontinued and the title of Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet was established.
o * In addition, served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. o ** In addition, served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (a NATO post). o *** In addition, served as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. ADM Kelso relinquished this position on 16 Sep 86 o # In addition, as of 1 October 2002, served as Commander, Fleet Forces Command. o
U.S. Fleet Forces Command, USFLTFORCOM Subordinate Commands – Ref. http://www.navy.mil and 313B). · Deputy Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Deputy Commander Fleet & Joint Operations and Commander, Task Force 20 (CTF 20) and Director, Combined Joint Operations From The Sea, Centre of Excellence o Commander, Naval Air Forces (COMNAVAIRFOR) and Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) ▪ Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT) ▪ Commander, Naval Air Force Reserve (COMNAVAIRES) ▪ Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) ▪ Commander, Military Sealift Command ▪ Commander, Naval Submarine Forces (COMNAVSUBFOR) and Commander, Naval Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMSUBLANT) ▪ Commander, Naval Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) ▪ Commander, Naval Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) and Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) ▪ Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVSURFLANT). Established in 1975 as a consolidation of the Cruiser-Destroyer, Amphibious, and Service Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet” (Ref. 313B18)
“COMNAVSURFLANT, one of the six United States Naval Type Commands (TYCOMS), was established in 1975 as a consolidation of the Cruiser-Destroyer, Amphibious, and Service Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In addition to SURFLANT's 70+ ships, there are special mission and fleet support units that make up the more than 29 commands of the Force. Our approx. 25,000 personnel are stationed both Stateside and on the high seas (from the Norwegian Sea in the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea). Additionally, Surface Forces provide a critical element to drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific.
Our Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates maintain constant readiness to engage enemy land targets, aircraft, ships, and submarines. Our Amphibious ships, with embarked U.S. Marines, project Sea Power ashore by maintaining the capability of landing the Marines by helicopters, amphibious track vehicles, air cushion landing craft, and assault craft whenever and wherever the need arises. The Naval Beach Group, consisting of the Amphibious Seabees, a Beach Master Unit, and Assault Craft Units, provide essential pre- and post-landing support to our Amphibious Forces.
In summary, the widely diversified and specialized Naval Surface Force Atlantic is an important instrument of national policy in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea, Caribbean Sea, and the Persian Gulf. "To Go in Harm's Way" in defense of the principles of Freedom and Democracy has been the rally call of our Sailors for over two hundred years” (Ref. 313B; 313B1; 313B2 & 313B8):
· Commander, Navy Munitions Command · Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command · Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command · Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) · Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command · Continental United States (CONUS) Regional Commands (for Homeland Defense/Security) · Commander, Regional Maintenance Centers · Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant)
USJFCOM
“USJFCOM gained a functional mandate to lead transformation of US military joint warfighting into the 21st Century. The command's geographical responsibility was modified to more closely align with existing NATO Allied Command Atlantic's (ACLANT) area of responsibility. The long history of cooperation with European Allies and then recent history in Central Europe indicated future military operations would not only be joint, but also combined national efforts.
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 projected that conflicts of the future would go to the side with the right technology, applied at the right time with the right warrior. The Command's redesignation reflected the commitment to experimentation with new warfighting concepts and technologies that would answer the call in the Joint Chiefs vision. Concurrently with the redesignation, the command was charged to answer another national call to support terrorist response operations in the continental. In response, USJFCOM created the first domestic Joint Task Force, JTF-Civil Support, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FBI, for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents in the United States” (Ref. 313B15aa).
US Joint Force Command (USJFCOM) established Joint Task Force - Olympics (JTF-O) in January 2001
“The Department of Defense was authorized to provide support to the XIX Winter Olympic Games, to occur between 8 and 24 February 2002, and the VII Paralympic Games, to occur between 7 and 17 March 2002. Both of these events were to take place in in Salt Lake City, Utah. As a result, US Joint Force Command (USJFCOM) established Joint Task Force - Olympics (JTF-O) in January 2001. JTF-O provided routine support for local and federal agencies during the events” (Ref. 313B15aa).
2002 Winter Olympics – Ref. 313W5
USJFCOM becomes dual-hatted as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT)
“On 17 April 2002, Defense officials announced changes in the Unified Command Plan. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) took over the homeland defense role from USJFCOM. JFCOM's Joint Task Force-Civil Support and related activities (including JTF-6) were to report to NORTHCOM. Also in 2002, the Iceland Defense Force and US Forces Azores were realigned with US European Command (USEUCOM). In addition, up until 2002, the commander of USJFCOM was dual-hatted as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), the headquarters for which was co-located with USJFCOM. That alliance command, which subsequently became Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), was as a result split off, and US officials consulted with NATO allies on the transition.
USJFCOM was to retain its mission as a "force generator" to the geographical commands and these changes were meant to free the command to focus on its mission of helping to transform the US military. This included experimentation, innovation, improving interoperability and reviewing, validating and writing joint doctrine and preparing battle-ready joint forces and coordinating joint training, simulation and modeling” (Ref. 313B15aa).
U.S. Joint Forces Command assumed the role of primary conventional force provider
“In late 2004, U.S. Joint Forces Command assumed the role of primary conventional force provider. This landmark change assigned nearly all U.S. conventional forces to Joint Forces Command. Requirements, for example, for U.S. service personnel to support the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia, were fed to JFCOM, in this case via Africa Command, and JFCOM liaised with the service staffs to obtain available forces. Along with this responsibility came the task to develop a new 'risk-assessment' process that provided national leaders a world-wide perspective on force-sourcing solutions. Its operations and exercises included Noble Resolve, an experimentation campaign plan to enhance homeland defense and improve military support to civil authorities in advance of and following natural and man-made disasters (Ref. 313B20) and Empire Challenge, an annual intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) interoperability demonstration” (Ref. Ref. 313B21).
The CNO disestablished COMFLTFORCOM) and COMLANTFLT and renamed COMLANTFLT to COMUSFLTFORCOM
“On 23 May 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issued OPNAV NOTICE 3111, Ser DNS-33/6U827232, that disestablished the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (COMFLTFORCOM) and Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMLANTFLT) and renamed COMLANTFLT to Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM), ordered to carry out the missions currently performed by COMFLTFORCOM and COMLANTFLT and serve as primary advocate for fleet personnel, training, requirements, maintenance, and operational issues, reporting administratively directly to the CNO as an Echelon 2 command. The previous title CFFC was disestablished at the same time. All forces reporting to COMLANTFLT or COMFLTFORCOM will now report to COMUSFLTFORCOM effectively immediately” (Ref. 313B & 313B2).
“On 31 October 2006, a ceremony was held to officially mark the transition of the United States Atlantic Fleet and Fleet Forces Command to the United States Fleet Forces Command. Three of the 37 previous admirals who held the top post in the Atlantic fleet attended the ceremony, held aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). The command will henceforth be known as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command” (Ref. 313B2).
The Goldwater-Nichols Act for Homeland Security - 2007 – Ref. 313W3 Colonel Michael Edwards, USAF Director of Operations United States Air Force Combat Support Office Why is a Goldwater-Nichols Act Needed for Homeland Security?
USJFCOM information on Noble Resolve - A coordinated, decisive response for critical mission planning. By Sharon Anderson - July-September 2007
“The variety and number of domestic and military operational roles the Defense Department fulfills in today's uncertain environment require mission rehearsals with civil authorities and an astonishing number of government and non-government agencies. Noble Resolve can help. Noble Resolve is a U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) campaign plan designed to enhance homeland defense and improve military support to civil authorities for quick and decisive action in the event of natural or man-made disasters. The aim of Noble Resolve is to develop solutions for U.S. agencies and organizations to use to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests.
Supported by U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Noble Resolve is the first of what will be a series of experiments held over a number of years on this theme. USJFCOM's Joint Innovation and Experimentation Directorate (J9) manage Noble Resolve experimentation.
According to Rear Adm. James Winnefeld, J9 director, more than 125 people from across the United States and multinational participants, including Canada, Germany, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, and others, came together in the weeklong event. USJFCOM collaborated with the U.S. Transportation Command and other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI and Customs and Border Protection. In this event, JFCOM teamed with the commonwealth of Virginia and, in a later phase, Oregon will be added.
Winnefeld discussed Noble Resolve with members of media April 26, emphasizing that it was important to understand how crucial the exercise was to understanding and planning the Department of Defense role in effectively assisting civil authorities. Referring to current disaster relief capabilities, Winnefeld said that organizations at every level need to improve disaster response methods and that JFCOM is eager to assist” (Ref. 313B20 – full article at reference).
Empire Challenge: Turning ISR Into Actionable Intelligence - Ref. 313B21
“Empire Challenge (EC 09) sets the stage for an annual demonstration of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) interoperability, executed by US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) under the sponsorship of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD/I).
The exercise, hosted by the U.S. Navy Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, began July 6, 2009 and runs until the end of the month, at the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California. While the real activity is taking place at China Lake, other locations throughout the world are taking part in the process of collecting, processing and distributing the data, turning it into situational analysis and comprehending. Locations taking part in the exercise include the Joint Intelligence Lab in Suffolk, Va., the Combined Air Operations Center-Experimental at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton, Va., service Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) labs, coalition sites in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency in the Netherlands.
The exercise will provide an opportunity to evaluate and study how current and future ISR solutions could co-operate and to what level they meet the warfighter requirements, as identified by combatant commanders, services and coalition partners, to better support to command and control, enhance coalition data sharing and interoperability. The exercise will also examine and improve the interoperability between national/strategic ISR and tactical ISR. Among the technical goals set for the exercise are the evaluation of new data sharing techniques, demonstration of 'multi-intelligence battlespace awareness' and assessment of the DCGS Initial Capabilities Document and Concept of Operations version 2” (Ref. 313B21 – full article at reference).
USFLTFORCOM gets a new Commander in 2009
“On 24 July 2009, Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr. relieved Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert as Commander” (Ref. 313B17).
USJFCOM JFCOM Disestablishment
“On 9 August 2010, as part of a series of initiatives designed to reduce overhead, duplication, and excess in the Department of Defense, and, over time, instill a culture of savings and restraint in America's defense institutions, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that Joint Forces Command has been slated for elimination as a budget-saving measure. Initially established to infuse jointness into everything the military does, especially the training and providing of forces for operations, Secretary Gates concluded that, over time, it had created an unneeded extra layer and step in the force management process. As part of the recommendation, USJFCOM's force management and sourcing functions were to be assigned to the Joint Staff while the remaining responsibilities were to be evaluated and those determined to be essential be re-assigned to other entities” (Ref. 313B15aa & 313B24).
“USJFCOM continued their “mission to provide comprehensive training that meets demands of the joint warfighter who continue to engage our adversaries in an ever-changing operational environment,” said Army Maj. Gen. Frederick S. Rudesheim, deputy director for joint and coalition warfighting. “Key functions and missions will be linked together in a more efficient and effective manner, providing an integrated approach to joint development and joint training”” (Ref. 313B15).
Gates to close JFCOM, cut gen. officer billets
“Defense Secretary Robert Gates killed U.S. Joint Forces Command on Monday, 9 August 2010 with the announcement that the Norfolk, Va.-based command will be shuttered “in about a year” as part of the latest round of cost-cutting measures.
The four-star command, home to 2,800 service members and employing more than 3,000 contractors, will pass along its primary mission — managing forces and coordinating deployments — to the office of the Joint Staff, Gates said at a Pentagon news briefing.
The move is part of a broader cost-cutting effort that Gates said is vital to maintaining the military’s current size and capabilities. Gates began a cost reduction effort last year by ending the Air Force’s F-22 program and trying to eliminate an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Gates also wants to cut 50 flag-officer billets in the next two years. He noted that the total number of jobs for generals and admirals has grown by about 100 since 2001.
The money-saving measures unveiled will have little immediate impact on most service members. But Gates said changes to the military’s Tricare health care system — either increases in fees or service cutbacks — may be on the horizon.
“There are no sacred cows, and health care cannot be an exception to that,” Gates said.
Gates also called for the elimination of two little-known agencies that he said were redundant and unnecessary: the Business Transformation Agency, created in 2006 to overhaul the Pentagon’s business practices, and office of the Networks and Defense Integration, or NII, that was set up in 2003 to oversee communications technology programs.
Navy Lt. Cmdr. Rob Lyon, a spokesman for U.S. Joint Forces Command, said there will be “much hard work and analysis” in the near future for the command. “We will do the best we can to provide solid data on which to base decisions.”
He also said the command has been given assurances that “our work force will receive the best professional career advice and placement assistance available.”
That assistance will begin with a Tuesday visit by Dr. Clifford Stanley, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, “to talk with our leadership about the way ahead,” Lyon said. “While this decision will understandably cause concern among our workforce, we will be diligent to make sure we keep distractions to a minimum and continue to provide the best possible support to the warfighter.” At his news briefing, Gates rattled off a list of cost-cutting efforts that will freeze budgets for many headquarters staffs and reduce the number of contractors across the military.
“Headquarters and support bureaucracies, military and civilian alike, have swelled to cumbersome and top-heavy proportions, growing over-reliant on contractors, and grown accustomed to operating with little consideration to cost,” Gates said.
The measures are politically essential to avert more severe budget cutbacks if lawmakers on Capitol Hill try to balance the budget on the back of the military, Gates said.
“My greatest fear is that in economically tough times, that people will see [the defense budget as] a place to solve the nation’s deficit problems,” he said.
Staff writer William H. McMichael contributed to this story. - DISCUSS: THE CUTS” (Ref. 313B27)
“On 6 January 2011, the plan to disestablish the United States Joint Forces Command – was officially approved in a memorandum by President Obama” (Ref. 313B15).
Presidential Memorandum -- Disestablishment of United States Joint Forces Command – Ref. 313B28 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - January 06, 2011
BARACK OBAMA
SOCJFCOM was redesignated as Special Operations Command - Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) and reassigned US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
“As part of the transition, on 29 April 2011, SOCJFCOM was redesignated as Special Operations Command - Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) and reassigned US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as part of the process of closing up USJFCOM” (Ref. 313B15aa). “The new organization created by this merger will remain in Norfolk, Va., and be known as the deputy director J7 for joint and coalition warfighting, a subordinate element of the Joint Staff J7” (Ref. 313B15).
Fleet Forces Command scheduled to take over Second Fleet's duties in Sep. 2011
“News reports in July 2011 said that in connection with the disestablishment of the United States Second Fleet, Fleet Forces Command would take over Second Fleet's duties on September 30, 2011” (Ref. 313B4).
Navy's Fleet Forces Command taking over Second Fleet duties Disestablishment
“On August 21, 2010, it was reported that Secretary Robert Gates was considering disestablishing Second Fleet.[9]. On January 6, 2011, it was reported via a DoD news article that the Navy would disestablish Second Fleet in order to "use those savings and more to fund additional ships."[10] The fleet was officially dissolved in a ceremony at Norfolk on 30 September 2011.[11] Second Fleet's responsibilities and its additional title of Commander, Task Force 20, were transferred to the re-organized United States Fleet Forces Command, as was the post of CJOS COE” (Ref. 313C).“The U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet is being disestablished as part of the Pentagon’s plan to save money.
“The U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet is being disestablished as part of the Pentagon’s plan to save money. The Second Fleet is responsible for training and certifying more than 125 ships. The Second Fleet and Fleet Forces Command teamed up for an exercise that’s testing their ability to manage a crisis. "Second Fleet has been the mainstay of training, certifying and putting forces to sea and squadrons on ships and our forces into Afghanistan and also Iraq, who've performed superbly, and our intent here is to continue with that rich history," stated Rear Admiral Scott T. Craig, Fleet Forces Deputy Chief of Staff” (Ref. 313B4).
SOCJFCOM was redesignated as Special Operations Command - Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) and reassigned US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
“As part of the transition, on 29 April 2011, SOCJFCOM was redesignated as Special Operations Command - Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) and reassigned US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as part of the process of closing up USJFCOM. On 1 August 2011, USJFCOM's service component commands reverted to the control of their respective services” (Ref. 313B15aa).
“The Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Center for Operational Analysis and the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate merge and transition to the Joint Staff as part of the disestablishment of USJFCOM.
The Joint Warfighting Center (J7), Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation directorate (J9) merged and transitioned from U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to the Joint Staff J7 today as part of USJFCOM’s disestablishment August 1, 2011.
The new organization created by this merger will remain in Nuffolk, Va., and be known as the deputy director J7 for joint and coalition warfighting, a subordinate element of the Joint Staff J7.
“We will continue our mission to provide comprehensive training that meets demands of the joint warfighter who continue to engage our adversaries in an ever-changing operational environment,” said Army Maj. Gen. Frederick S. Rudesheim, deputy director for joint and coalition warfighting. “Key functions and missions will be linked together in a more efficient and effective manner, providing an integrated approach to joint development and joint training”” (Ref. By Army Sgt. Josh LeCappelain, USJFCOM Public Affairs, (NORFOLK, Va., August 1, 2011) - 313B24).
“General Ray Odierno was given the task of winding down JFCOM” (Ref. 313B15).
“On 4 August 2011, Joint Forces Command cased its flag colors (313B29) and officially disestablished on 31 August 2011” (Ref. 313B15; 313B22 & 313B23)
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)
“As of August 1, 2011, the Joint Warfighting Center (J7), Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation directorate (J9) merged and transitioned from Joint Forces Command to the Joint Staff J7 as part of USJFCOM’s disestablishment.
Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT) is the only NATO command in North America and the only permanent NATO headquarters outside of Europe. Reflecting NATO as a whole, ACT has a worldwide presence. As well as being co-located with United States Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, there is an ACT command element located in Belgium. ACT is NATO's leading agent for change, driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance. ACT focuses on areas such as training and education, concept development, comprehensive approach, experimentation, and research and technology and using NATO's ongoing operations and work with the NATO Response Force (NRF) to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance” (Ref. 313B15). respective services” (Ref. 313B15aa).
“Prior to 2002, ACT was designated as Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), and the Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command was dual hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), an important link for both US allies and citizens. SACLANT was a US Army General Officer. He was nominated by the President of the United States and approved by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest governing body. He received his direction from the NATO Military Committee. The Deputy SACLANT was a UK Royal Navy Admiral” (Ref. 313B15 & 313B15aa).
“ACLANT was one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 2 major strategic headquarters and the only one in North America. It was the senior military authority for NATO land, sea and air forces in the North Atlantic area, from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, and from the East Coast of North America to the West Coast of Africa and Europe, approximately 12 million square miles.
ACLANT's mission was to contribute towards the military capability required to preserve the peace, security and territorial integrity of alliance member states. Geographic realities reminded members of ACLANT that NATO was an Atlantic alliance, dependent on vital sea lines for economic well being in peacetime and survival in war. SACLANT Headquarters was co-located with USJFCOM in Norfolk, Virginia.
SACLANT's staff, including external branches, consisted of some 574 members (405 military and 87 civilian) from 17 of the 19 NATO nations, including France who had a mission located near SACLANT Headquarters. Allied Command Atlantic had a permanently assigned multinational naval force called the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which consisted of 6-10 ships from different NATO nations. The command was also responsible for the SACLANT Undersea Research Centre, located in La Spezia, Italy, which conducted marine research for both major NATO military commands and operates the research vessel Alliance. ACLANT was divided into 3 geographical command areas: the Western Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic and the South Atlantic. Within this framework, there were 5 major subordinate commanders, directly responsible to SACLANT. They were Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic Area (CINCEASTLANT) in Northwood/London, United Kingdom; Commander-in-Chief, Western Atlantic Area (CINCWESTLANT) in Norfolk, Virginia, United States; Commander-in-Chief, Southern Atlantic Area (CINCSOUTHLANT) in Oeiras/Lisbon, Portugal; and Commander Striking Fleet, Atlantic (COMSTRIKFLTLANT) and Commander, Submarines Allied Command Atlantic (COMSUBACLANT) both located in Norfolk, Virginia. Also included in the area of responsibility are the island commands of the Faeroes, the Azores, Madeira, Greenland, Bermuda and Iceland.
During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's military command structure was reorganised with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. One Strategic Command would be focused on NATO's operations (this becoming Allied Command Operations) and the other would be focused on transforming NATO. ACLANT was redesignated as Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Concurrently and as part of reorganization of USJFCOM in 2002, caused a split between CINCUSJFCOM and SACLANT, with CINCUSJFCOM no longer being dual-hatted as the new Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)” (Ref. 313B15aa).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USJFCOM_SEAL.gif
US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
“United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was a former Unified Combatant Command of the United States Armed Forces. USJFCOM was a functional command that provided specific services to the military. The last commander was Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno. As directed by the President to identify opportunities to cut costs and rebalance priorities, Defense Secretary Robert Gates recommended that USJFCOM be disestablished and its essential functions reassigned to other unified combatant commands. Formal disestablishment occurred on August 4, 2011 during which time US Joint Forces Command cased its colors during a ceremony held in in Norfolk, Virginia, marking the end of the Command. During the ceremony, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, awarded Army General Raymond T. Odierno, the JFCOM's last commander, with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal for his service in shutting down the command” (Ref. 313B15 & 313B15aa).
“CUSFFC previously served as the Naval component of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) until the disestablishment of USJFCOM January 6, 2011. CFFC is also assigned as the supporting service component commander to Commander, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) as well as to Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)” (Ref. 313B).
“Headquartered in the Norfolk-Suffolk area of Virginia, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was one of 9 unified commands in the Department of Defense. It was the only command with both a geographic region and a functional responsibility to support the other 4 geographic commanders. Among his duties, the Commander-in-Chief, USJFCOM (CINCUSJFCOM), oversaw military operations in the North Atlantic geographic area and supported the other commanders-in-chief in their geographic regions around the world.
USJFCOM provided trained and ready forces to deploy rapidly and conduct sustained operations worldwide, whether next door in Haiti, or halfway around the world in Bosnia, Rwanda or Kuwait. USJFCOM deployed supporting units on a rotating basis to the Balkans, Mediterranean, Middle East and Arabian Peninsula. They were key to the reduction and prevention of conflicts, serving as very visible reminders of America's commitment to peace and stability” (Ref. 313B15aa).
Mission
“United States Joint Forces Command was the only combatant command focused on the transformation of U.S. military capabilities. The commander of USJFCOM oversaw the command's four primary roles in transformation – joint concept development and experimentation, joint training, joint interoperability and integration, and the primary conventional force provider as outlined in the Unified Command Plan approved by the President. Its Unified Command Plan designated USJFCOM as the "transformation laboratory" of the United States military to enhance the combatant commanders' capabilities to implement the president's strategy. USJFCOM developed joint operational concepts, tested those concepts through rigorous experimentation, educated joint leaders, trained joint task force commanders and staffs, and recommended joint solutions to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to better integrate their warfighting capabilities” (Ref. 313B15).
Organization
“USJFCOM included members from each branch of the U.S. military, civil servants, contract employees, and consultants. It had four component commands, a sub-unified command (Special Operations component is SOCJFCOM and eight subordinate activities, including: Joint Warfighting Center; Joint Systems Integration Center; Joint Transformation Command for Intelligence; and Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). JFCOM's Service components were the CONUS based commands that provided forces to other combatant commands: United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), United States Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM), Air Combat Command (ACC), and United States Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM)” (Ref. 313B15).
USJFCOM Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) (J9)
“USJFCOM Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) (J9) aimed to develop innovative joint concepts and capabilities providing experimentally proven solutions to the most pressing problems facing the joint force. It aimed to rapidly deliver operationally relevant solutions to support current operations and drive DOTMLPF and policy changes to better enable the future joint force. JCD&E aimed to provide thought leadership and collaborative environments to generate innovative ideas with a range of interagency, multinational, academic and private sector partners.
The C2 (Command and Control) Core was a DoD project sponsored by Joint Forces Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Network and Information Integration (OASD/NII) to develop an open standard-supporting, extensible markup language (XML)-based command and control (C2) data exchange. It represents the first major implementation of the Universal Core v2.0, a federal information sharing initiative. It supports the DoD Net Centric Data Strategy by enabling data to be visible, accessible, understandable, trustworthy and interoperable. The overarching goal of this project is to support national and coalition warfighters by improving joint interoperability at the data and information layer.
Accomplishing these strategic goals within the C2 community involves publishing and evolving agreed-upon standards that exchange partners (services and, down the line, combatant commands and agencies) can use to share data more broadly, efficiently and effectively. The C2 Core standards also link C2 design guidance emerging at both the DoD enterprise level and within multiple C2-related communities of interest and programs of record to support the broadest range of interoperability requirements possible” (Ref. 313B15).
Hampton Roads area of Virginia, USJFCOM
“In the Hampton Roads area of Virginia, USJFCOM was a force of more than 2,300 people including members from each branch of the US military, civil servants, contractors and consultants. This included a headquarters staff of over 500 active duty military personnel, representing each of the 4 services, and approximately 300 civilian and contract employees. Additionally, at times there were as many as 4 component commands, 3 sub-unified commands, 2 joint task forces and 9 subordinate activities assigned to USJFCOM.
As chief advocate for jointness, USJFCOM maximized the nation's future and present military capabilities through joint concept development and experimentation, recommending joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training and providing ready continental US-based forces and capabilities to support other combatant commanders-in-chief, the Atlantic Theater and domestic requirements.
USJFCOM had been tasked with developing future concepts for joint warfighting. Such work included and strengthened Service efforts, drawing on the best of industry, and following the will of the citizens as expressed through Congress. New ideas for future warfare had to be validated in practical experiments. Some things could be evaluated by computer-driven modeling and simulation, but sooner or later, new operational measures had to be tried in the air, at sea, and on the ground. The US military had a long tradition of honing skills in live wargames, from the fleet problems of the 1930s that defined carrier warfare to the Army's famous Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941 that developed combined arms air/ground operations.
In addition to this functional responsibility, USJFCOM had responsibility for the North Atlantic and adjacent arctic and subarctic waters. Although the threat in the region was low, the political and economic importance of the Transatlantic link remained vital. Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, and Bermuda constituted vital ground. The Atlantic sea lanes and air lanes were always crowded with traffic crucial to the well being of many countries” (Ref. 313B15aa).
“Among the command's many directorates and departments was Project Alpha, a JFCOM rapid idea analysis group created to "identify high-impact ideas from industry, academia and the defense community that could transform the United States Department of Defense into an organization better equipped to deal with the uncertain landscape of the future” (Ref. 313B15).
Project Alpha “Project Alpha is a U.S. Joint Forces Command rapid idea analysis group. It was created to “scout the future” and identify high-impact ideas from industry, academia and the defense community that could transform the Department of Defense into an organization better equipped to deal with the uncertain landscape of the future.
The group aims to accelerate transformation through the swift analysis and transfer of practical ideas to the JFCOM joint concept development & experimentation (JCD&E) efforts and where appropriate, other DoD agencies with the ability to further mature and develop proposals for incorporation into their own joint transformation efforts.
Project Alpha's success in this endeavor relies upon on its ability to identify the usefulness of new ideas to joint operations, and then link them with the emerging concepts that support them. When ideas are coupled in this fashion, they will take on relevance for a variety of agencies in the defense community.
Project Alpha provides awareness of new ideas throughout DoD, as well as reinvigorate and improve ideas that may not have been initially recognized as relevant to joint transformation efforts.
Project Alpha focuses on the discovery, development and application of fresh ideas to solve problems in the real world of national security. It is not about program management or acquisition.
Documenting and articulating these ideas is the responsibility of three to four person “idea teams” that employ a rapid analysis process, or RAP. The RAP streamlines the vetting process for a new concept and gets the knowledge into the hands of appropriate decision makers more quickly than the traditional Department of Defense budgeting and planning cycle.
Project Alpha teams can move from issue identification to RAP completion in 3-4 months, which will result in production of ten to twelve RAPs per year.
Through our RAP process, journal publications, seminars, workshops, limited objective experiments and contributions to service Title X war games, Project Alpha will work to speed the introduction of good ideas into the joint force.
More importantly, Project Alpha will seek to build a core constituency of idea- generating organizations committed to the discovery and implementation of transformative ideas.
Rapid Analysis process The PA objective is to convince DoD agencies who would benefit to adopt and cultivate new ideas, and to ensure that good ideas complement the command's JCD&E efforts.
RAP reports will introduce relevant ideas to J9 for inclusion in the formal military recommendation process and, when appropriate, take ideas directly to the services and other transformation stakeholders for immediate action. Initial efforts have resulted in an increased flow of good ideas into and out of the joint experimentation directorate for further maturation and very soon, expectations are that ideas with demonstrated utility will be headed toward operational implementation.
Currently, four RAP reports have been produced:
• Swarming Entities – the Operational Utilities of Establishing Humans-On-The-Loop. Using lessons learned from bees and ants, the idea is to use numerous unmanned systems working in collaboration with each other to converge from disperse locations to strike and disable targets. Entities control themselves through use of digital signal to direct other entities to a target or to avoid a target. One person could monitor and control lots of small cheap unmanned vehicles rather than a team controlling one UAV.
• Use of Compressive Receivers in Detecting and Locating “Hard-To-Get” Threat Emitters. Increase ability of friendly forces to detect future weapons. Specifically, use compressive receivers used in SR71 Blackbird aircraft to detect several advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). • Medical Operations Transformation. Integrate medical planners and command and control into the standing joint force headquarters to help guard against biological, chemical and radiological agents. • Pattern Recognition For Time-Critical Targeting. Building software that detect patterns in sensor tracking data of enemy missiles and air defense capabilities. Patterns could determine where loading facilities, bases are located, the type of weapon, and perhaps enemy intent” (Ref. 313B22).
“USJFCOM was formed in 1999 when the old United States Atlantic Command was renamed and given a new mission: leading the transformation of the U.S. military through experimentation and education. USLANTCOM had been active from 1947 to 1993 as a primarily U.S. Navy command, focused upon the wartime defence of the Atlantic sea lanes against Soviet attack. After the end of the Cold War, a 1993 reorganization gave the Command a new acronym, USACOM, and brought United States Army Forces Command and Air Combat Command under its authority” (Ref. 313K & 313B15).
Project Alpha was discontinued
“As of August 1, 2011, Project Alpha was discontinued as part of an internal reorganization of U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Experimentation Directorate” (Ref. 313B15aa).
USJFCOM's service component commands reverted to the control of their respective services
“On 1 August 2011, USJFCOM's service component commands reverted to the control of their respective services” (Ref. 313B15aa).
Joint Forces Command Cases Its Colors - Aug. 4, 2011 – 313B29
“The need for a joint force hasn’t gone away, but the need for a specific command dedicated to “jointness” has, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command furled its colors today.
The command, established in 1999 to champion getting all branches of the military to work together more closely, cased its colors at a ceremony in Suffolk, Va.
Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, awarded Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the organization’s last commander, with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal for his service in shutting down the command. Odierno will succeed Gen. Martin E. Dempsey -- who will become Joint Chiefs chairman upon Mullen’s retirement -- as Army chief of staff.
Mullen acknowledged that many in the crowd may have had bittersweet feelings at today’s event. “You can take genuine pride in [Joint Forces Command’s] essential role in transforming and guiding the separate branches of our military into a truly joint force,” he said. The U.S. military has made tremendous strides since the early 1980s, when operations in Grenada and Lebanon pointed to gaps among the services, Mullen noted.
“Through the course of two wars, we have built an incredible joint force in ways that many of us could not have imagined,” he said. “In fact, your efforts have permeated every level of our military, and just two days ago in Baghdad, I fielded not one, but two questions from troops who are focused on earning joint qualifications and on the lessons we have learned from fighting and operating jointly.” Operating jointly now is embedded in military thinking, and the practical experience that soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines gain from joint service in the wars returns to their services with different perspectives, the chairman said.
“In Afghanistan, for example, the highways, byways and flyways are patrolled, protected and nurtured by a joint and coalition team, including explosive ordnance removal crews along the Ring Road, provincial reconstruction teams from Helmand to Kunduz to Khost, and persistent joint close air support that is available anywhere at any time throughout the country,” the admiral said. “These efforts and our evolution as a joint force remind me of Henry Ford’s words that ‘Coming together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, working together is success.’ If that is so, then everyone here has indeed succeeded as we post [Joint Forces Command’s] colors one last time.”
Joint Forces Command put in place procedures and techniques that help at the highest levels of strategy as well, the chairman said. This year, he noted, procedures the command put in place and tested allowed the United States and allies to save countless lives in Libya by quickly putting together the operation to stop Moammar Gadhafi’s forces from driving on Benghazi.
The lessons learned also allowed the United States to turn over operations to NATO seamlessly, he added.
“While I believe our experiences in Libya and elsewhere validate our past investments, I believe they also speak to the nature of future joint operations, for they will not be joint for the sake of jointness. They will be joint and combined because the international, economic and threat environments demand we work together in order to be successful,” Mullen said. Indeed,” he added, “the world has become so flat, so fast and so interconnected that we can no longer draw neat lines between the sea and the shore, the horizon and the sky. When the space, cyber and information domains are considered, it becomes clear that our services truly operate in more battle space collectively than they can control exclusively.”
The push toward closer cooperation will continue, moved in part because of tightening defense budgets, Mullen said. “No one can do it alone,” he added, “and quite frankly, no one can afford to do it alone, either.” Mullen cited Air Force and Navy cooperation on the air-sea battle concept, setting aside parochial interests to overcome emerging 21st century threats. “This and many other joint approaches would have been almost unthinkable a mere generation ago,” he said” (Ref. 313B29).
Biographies:
Related Sites:
Former commanders - Ref. 313B15 · Admiral Harold Gehman, USN (1999–2000) · General William F. Kernan, USA (2000–2002) · Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN (2002–2005) · General Lance L. Smith, USAF (2005–2007) · General James N. Mattis, USMC (2007–2010) · Lieutenant-General Keith M. Huber, USA (2010) (acting) · General Raymond T. Odierno, USA (2010–2011)
External links
· U.S. Fleet Forces Command official website · Former commanders of U.S. Fleet Forces Command · More detail about the Atlantic Fleet and its components · History (U.S. Fleet Forces Command website)
|
